





Identity, Character and Ethics
Moral Identity and Reasons for Action
Abstract
The paper discusses the meaning, role and importance of moral identity and character for 
ethics and for leading a good life (the attainably of good life and pursuit of happiness). The 
modern society is a society of permanent change and the feeling of uncertainty. The world 
seems fragmented and discontinuous. It is very difficult to form a permanent identity in 
such a world. In the past the choice of the life project was the choice of all choices. In liquid 
modernity, identity is flexible and in a state of permanent transformation, in which one per-
petually redefines oneself through becoming someone other than one has been so far. The 
central question from which the papers addresses these topics is whether our moral identity 
ever provides us with good reasons for acting and further, which of the moral theories are 









































































































Although	 refusing	 to	 provide	 a	 definite	 an-
swer	 Sartre	 interestingly	 enough	 elaborates	
and	 analyses	 the	 student’s	 situation	 along	
several	dimension.	When	facing	a	choice	be-
tween	 staying	 at	 home	 with	 his	 mother	 and	




one	 hand	 and	 more	 abstract,	 future	 oriented	
and	uncertain	(in	the	sense	of	the	success	of	




these	 different	 dimensions	 are	 not	 basic	 for	
the	 dilemma	 in	 question;	 they	 only	 add	 ad-
ditional	 layers	 of	 complexity	 and	 difficulty	
to	the	basic	dilemma	of	being	faced	with	two	












dilemma,	 so	 they	 somehow	 distinguish	 be-
tween	 normal	 or	 everyday	 moral	 life	 and	
“critical	 ethical	 moments”	 as	 James	 calls	
them	or	“existential	choices”	(cf.	Ruth	Anna	
Putnam	 “The	 Moral	 Life	 of	 a	 Pragmatist”,	
in:	 O.	 J.	 Flannagan	 and	A.	 O.	 Rorty	 (eds.),	
Identity, Character, and Morality,	MIT	Press,	
Cambridge	(MA)	1993,	pp.	67–89).	Bernard	

















Charles	Taylor,	Sources of the Self: The Mak-
















Questions of theory: 



























of	 their	 consequences.	 So	 in	 order	 to	 determine	 what	 the	 right	 choice	 to	
make	 is,	 Sartre’s	 student	 must	 take	 into	 consideration	 all	 the	 future	 con-













but	only	 through	 the	value	of	 the	consequences,	namely	by	 taking	 into	ac-
count	e.g.	a	possible	young	man’s	agonizing	suffering	when	having	decided	
to	abandon	his	mother.11	But	this	is	not	the	direct	connection	between	moral	























Lack of Character. Personality and Moral 









jan	 Žalec	 (eds.),	 On Cultivating Faith and 
Science – Reflections on Two Key Topics of 
Modern Ethics,	 Lit-Verlag,	 Berlin	 2007,	 pp.	
203–221.
10








“[P]ersons	 loose	 their	 separateness	 as	 bene-
ficiaries	 of	 the	 Utilitarian	 provisions,	 since	





from	 separateness	 involves	 agency.	 It	 turns	
out	on	the	point	that	the	basic	bearer	of	value	
for	 Utilitarianism	 is	 the	 state	 of	 affairs,	 and	
hence,	 when	 the	 relevant	 causal	 differences	




actors	 and	 decision-makers	 with	 distinctive	
psychological	identity	and	integrity.
12
One	 could	 say	 that	 consequentialism	 must	








































Virtue, character and identity
Virtue	 ethics	 is	 often	 characterized	 as	 being	 agent-oriented,	 agent-focused	
or	agent-centred,	the	mentioned	adjectives	being	differently	interpreted	but	
nonetheless	 pointing	 into	 the	 direction	 of	 a	 shift	 from	 the	 attention	 being	
directed	 to	 the	 action	 (its	 consequences,	 its	 being	 subsumed	 under	 some	











































sonal	moral	 agent	 and	deontological	 theories	 a	picture	of	 an	 impartial	 and	
not	necessarily	impersonal	agent,	virtue	ethics	on	the	other	hand	views	moral	
agent	and	neither	impartial	not	impersonal.19
The difference between first- person 
and third-person perspective














have	done	what	would	be	 right	 for	him.	Raz	analyses	 such	possibility	and	
14
David	 W.	 Ross,	 The Right and the Good,	
Clarendon	 Press,	 Oxford	 1930;	 and	 Robert	




Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and 
Psychological Realism,	 Cambridge	 Univer-
sity	Press,	Cambridge	(MA)	1991,	p.	43–44.
16
See	Michael	Slote,	From Morality to Virtue,	
Oxford	 University	 Press,	 Oxford	 2001,	 p.	
3–7;	for	a	definition	of	a	radical,	agent-based	




sition	 to	perceive	or	know	what	 is	 right	and	
performs	such	act	because	they	are	right.	An	
agent-based	 virtue	 ethics	 understands	 moral	
status	 of	 acts	 as	 derivative	 form	 the	 aretaic	
facts	about	the	agents	(their	virtues,	motives,	








also	 in	 a	 deep	 dilemma	 about	 what	 path	 to	
pursue,	 either	 stay	 with	 his	 family	 or	 aban-
don	 it,	 going	 off	 to	 Tahiti	 and	 commit	 his	
life	 to	 realization	of	his	painting	 talent.	She	
then	goes	on	to	argue	that	his	identity	matters	








Joseph	Raz,	Engaging Reason: On the Theory 
of Value and Action,	Oxford	University	Press,	
New	York	 1999,	 pp.	 218–246;	 reprinted	 in:	
Brad	Hooker	and	Margaret	Little	(eds.),	Mo-












































ing	 their	 lives.	Those	 activities	 are	 predominantly	 goal-directed,	 but	 being	
successful	in	exemplifying	a	particular	ideal	of	personal	excellence	is	fully	
compatible	 with	 being	 unsuccessful	 in	 one’s	 project.	 One	 can	 obtain	 such	














































Importance of What We Care About	 (Cam-
bridge	 University	 Press,	 Cambridge	 (MA)	












about	 the	 choose	 alternative.	 So,	 the	 dilem-
matic	element	of	his	situation	is	either	in	not	
knowing	 which	 of	 the	 alternatives	 he	 cares	













excess	 and	 deficiency.	 Personal	 excellences	
























Identitet, karakter i etika
Moralni identitet i razlozi za djelovanje
Sažetak
U članku se raspravlja o značenju, ulozi i važnosti moralnog identiteta i karaktera za etiku 
i vođenje dobrog života (dostupnost dobrog života i potraga za srećom). Moderno društvo je 
društvo stalne promjene i osjećaja nesigurnosti. Svijet se doima fragmentiranim i diskontinu-
iranim. Vrlo je teško formirati trajni identitet u takvome svijetu. U prošlosti je izbor životnog 
projekta bio izbor nad izborima. U tekućoj modernosti, identitet je fleksibilan i u stanju stalne 
transformacije, u kojem pojedinac neprestano redefinira sebe postajući tako netko drugi nego 
što je bio do tada. Centralno pitanje kojim ovaj rad prilazi navedenim temama je nudi li nam 
ikada moralni identitet dovoljno dobre razloge za djelovanje i, nadalje, koja od moralnih teorija 




Identität, Charakter und Ethik
Moralische Identität und Beweggründe zum Handeln
Zusammenfassung
In dem Artikel werden der Hintersinn, die Rolle sowie die Wichtigkeit der moralischen Identität 
für die Ethik und eine vortreffliche Lebensführung besprochen (Erreichbarkeit des guten Lebens 
und Streben nach dem Glück). Die moderne Gesellschaft ist eine Gesellschaft des ununter-
brochenen Wandels und Ungewissheitsgefühls. Die Welt erscheint bruchstückhaft und diskon-
tinuierlich. Es ist äußert prekär, in einer solchen Welt eine Daueridentität zu entfalten. In der 
Vergangenheit stand die Wahl des Lebensprojekts für eine Wahl aller Wahlen. In der flüssigen 
Modernität fungiert die Identität flexibel, in einem Zustand der Dauerumwandlung, in welchem 
das Individuum sich selbst stetig aufs Neue formuliert, indem es zu jemand anderem wird, als es 
bisher war. Die Zentralproblematik, von welcher her dieses Paper die angeschnittenen Themen 
angeht, wirft die Frage auf, ob uns unsere moralische Identität jemals mit guten Anlässen zur 
Aktion versieht und ferner, welche der Moraltheorien die geeignetste ist, um eine positive Be-







Identité, caractère et éthique
Identité morale et raisons d’action
Résumé
L’article examine la signification, le rôle et l’importance de l’identité morale et du caractère 
pour l’éthique et pour la conduite d’une vie bonne (la faisabilité d’une vie bonne et la quête du 
bonheur). La société moderne est une société de changement perpétuel et de sentiment d’insé-
curité. Le monde paraît fragmentaire et discontinu. Il est très difficile de former une identité 
permanente dans un tel monde. Par le passé, le choix du projet de vie était le choix de tous les 
choix. Dans la modernité actuelle, l’identité est flexible et en état de transformation perma-
nente dans lequel l’individu ne cesse de se redéfinir en devenant autre que celui qu’il avait été 
jusque-là. La question centrale par laquelle ce travail approche les thèmes mentionnés est de 
savoir si l’identité morale nous offre jamais suffisamment de bonnes raisons pour agir, puis, de 





For	 more	 on	 Kekes’	 and	 Bauman’s	 account	
of	the	art	of	life	see	Vojko	Strahovnik,	“The	
Art	of	Life:	Kekes	and	Bauman	on	Attaining	
the	 Good	 Life”,	 in:	 Janez	 Juhant	 and	 Bojan	
Žalec	(eds.),	Art of Life. Origins, Foundations 
and Perspectives,	 Lit-Verlag,	 Berlin	 2010,	
pp.	 91–98.	 See	 also	 Janez	 Juhant,	 “On	 Liv-
ing	With:	Dialogue	as	the	Way	to	the	Art	of	
Personal	and	Common	Life”,	in:	J.	Juhant	&	





pp.	 85–100	 for	 a	 further	 elaboration	 of	 the	
concepts	of	moral	identity,	dialogue	as	a	form	
of	solidarity	and	the	central	role	of	humanity	
in	ethics	which	are	relevant	for	the	topics	of	
this	article.
